Marvin Park, Senior Vice President
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a censure resolution against Iran this morning but stopped short of referring Tehran to the United Nations Security Council. The Islamic Republic’s response, heightened security measures in the region, and the faltering U.S.-Iran talks suggest that we could be headed toward military strikes on Iran and an extended period of uncertainty.
The origins of today’s resolution began in the first Trump administration with another IAEA censure resolution. In 2019, the IAEA had questions about Iran’s nuclear activities, and the resolution adopted five years ago reaffirmed that Iran should answer the IAEA’s questions and provide the Agency access to undeclared locations. The IAEA subsequently visited Iran and found multiple man-made uranium particles at three locations. The Agency decided to not visit a fourth undeclared location (Lavisan-Shian) because Iran conducted extensive sanitization and levelling at the location.
The IAEA director general’s most recent report explained that Iran has conducted undeclared nuclear activities with undeclared nuclear material at multiple undeclared locations. The IAEA safeguards system, which Iran agreed to separate from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA), requires Tehran to provide the Agency access and declarations of activities to ensure that nuclear material and activities are not contributing to military purposes (nuclear weapons).
The IAEA investigation is focused on activities linked to Iran’s nuclear weapons program which ended in 2003. Iran’s concealment and sanitization of activities as well as its lack of credible answers, suggests that Tehran is covering up past and possibly current evidence of prohibited nuclear weapons activities. The IAEA has declared that it cannot verify the “exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”
Iran responded to the June 12 resolution by informing the IAEA that it would start a third uranium enrichment site and that the facility was already “built, prepared, and located in a secure and invulnerable place.” A spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran also noted that Iran will replace old centrifuges with advanced centrifuges which would increase the production rate of enriched uranium.
Last night, nonessential staff from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad were ordered to evacuate. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth authorized the departure of family members of military personnel in the Middle East.
The sixth round of U.S.-Iran negotiations is scheduled to take place Sunday in Oman. The talks have not produced a deal because the Trump administration wants the deal to end Iran’s enrichment program, and Iran will not accept a deal that ends its enrichment program.
There are strong indications that if Tehran does not accept the U.S. offer on Sunday, Israel could strike some or all of Tehran’s nuclear program. A military strike would likely delay but not end Iran’s nuclear efforts. Since February 2021, Iran has reduced the IAEA’s ability to conduct verification and monitoring activities. The decreased access has led the Agency to conclude that it does not know the production rates or current inventory of centrifuges, which could allow Iran to bring the third site or another covert site online quickly. Thus, Iran could respond to a military strike by quickly establishing a covert nuclear site while also moving the nuclear material before the strike providing a pathway to a nuclear weapon.
Iran could also respond to an Israeli military strike by threatening U.S. embassies in the region and a direct strike or use the Houthis and other proxies to attack Israel, Saudi Arabia, and international shipping.
The IAEA Board of Governors could refer Iran to the UN Security Council. In 2005, the last time the IAEA declared Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, the Board referred Tehran to the Security Council less than a year later.
In response to the referral, the U.S. and its European partners (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) could restore the UN Security Council sanctions that were termination by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) which implemented the JCPOA. A JCPOA participant – the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, since the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA –could declare that there is a “significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA” by Iran. It would trigger a process whereby China and Russia could not use its veto to stop the reimposition of UN sanctions. This mechanism expires on October 18. Russia is the president of the Security Council in October, which could accelerate the timeline to August or September when Panama and South Korea hold the rotating Security Council presidency, respectively.
AGS will continue to monitor for developments in the Middle-East and provide relevant updates as necessary.
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