Now is the time to get the National Security Council right
OPINION:
After the 100-day mark of President Trump’s second presidential term, he is confronted with a challenge that has frustrated many of his predecessors: how to structure the National Security Council staff to ensure the success of his foreign and national security policy agenda.
The hurdle before Mr. Trump is similar to what he faced upon assuming office in 2017. Under Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the NSC policy staff ballooned in size and scope well beyond anything envisioned or intended at the NSC’s inception after World War II. Under recent Democratic presidents, the staff has grown to occupy a significant chunk of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building on the White House campus. Under the Democrats, NSC staffers too often saw their role as dictating to Cabinet departments and running policy, including operational military and intelligence matters, from 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. Many senior military officers have horror stories of receiving micromanaging directives from Obama- or Biden-era NSC staffers.
In both his presidencies, Mr. Trump inherited NSC staffs of more than 300 officials who had grown used to the Obama-Biden approach of NSC centrality in the policymaking process. Such an approach contradicts all historical models of a successful NSC staff. Under the leadership of former national security advisers such as Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley, the NSC worked to give the president a serious policy process to access the best information and views from across the government and make the best decisions. Critically, the NSC then ensured the implementation of those presidential directives. Under the “Scowcroft Model,” the NSC staff provides options and ensures implementation; it does not seek to impose its policy preferences on the rest of the administration.
Implementing the Scowcroft Model is far harder to do in practice than in theory. Whether career or political, professionals drawn to NSC service often have strongly held views on policy direction and see their time at the NSC as a way to execute their policy preferences. It is also deeply challenging after a presidential transition to ensure an appropriately scoped and aligned NSC, as the incoming president will almost assuredly inherit a significant number of staffers from the previous administration. Mr. Trump has faced this problem twice. His “holdover” staff often saw their mission as perpetuating the policies of the previous administration or, more benignly, simply refusing to accept an NSC concept that devolves policymaking to the departments and agencies.
As Secretary of State and acting National Security Adviser Marco Rubio seeks to ensure an NSC staff that assists the president in accomplishing his bold agenda for American national security policy, we recommend he consider the following steps:
First, undertake a significant reorganization of the NSC along the lines Mr. Trump directed in 2019. The purpose of this effort was to realign the NSC around the Scowcroft Model, which requires a far leaner and more tailored structure than has been prevalent under Democratic presidents. Upon the conclusion of Mr. Trump’s first term in 2021, the NSC policy staff numbered around 110 professionals, a two-thirds reduction from the Obama level. The organizational structure was also simplified, with unnecessary directorates eliminated or consolidated and some functions devolved back to the departments and agencies. This smaller staff allowed for better management and reduced the chances of mischief from the NSC. The laser-focused staff of the latter part of Mr. Trump’s first term ensured his policies were conceived and implemented successfully. Given the successful Department of Government Efficiency effort to trim the broader administrative state, we believe the NSC policy staff could be streamlined to 60 people, the same number of NSC staffers that President Dwight D. Eisenhower employed.
Second, reevaluate the criteria for hiring career and political staff at the NSC, keeping in mind that the NSC staff are White House staffers who report directly to the president through the national security adviser. Loyalty to the president’s agenda should be a given. Mr. Trump has suffered far too many rogue operators at the NSC who did not have the country’s best interests at heart. Vetting for NSC staff should also focus on the “humility factor”: Is a policy professional willing to subordinate his or her personal views to the mission of formulating and coordinating the president’s policy and ensuring its implementation?
Third, Congress has exceeded its authority in recent years and sought to impose its preferences on the organization of the NSC. Although some of these congressional interventions have worthy policy objectives, including the creation of a shipbuilding office within the NSC, others, such as a duplicative national cyber director, simply create confusion and chaos in the staff ranks. The president should have full authority to organize his personal staff as he sees fit. The White House should aggressively push back on congressional meddling at the NSC.
Fourth and most challenging, the NSC is far too reliant on career officials detailed from across the interagency. Although many of these officials are professionals who seek to serve a president regardless of ideology or party affiliation, Mr. Trump’s rejection of key tenets of the “Establishment’s” conventional wisdom has produced far too many detailees unwilling to serve impartially. The president is entitled to a personal national security staff dedicated to his vision. Assembling such a staff requires a substantially increased budget to hire personnel directly at the White House. With Republican control of Congress, Mr. Trump should insist on funding for an NSC staff that can truly reflect his priorities. Future presidents should do the same.
At the end of his first term, Mr. Trump implemented a model of NSC leadership that focused on humility, restraint and commitment to a fair and impartial policy process. His NSC team assisted him in achieving some of his first term’s biggest successes, including the Abraham Accords, the Serbia-Kosovo economic normalization agreement, dramatic changes in U.S. policy toward China, the largest increase in European contributions to NATO defense spending in history and the rebuilding of the U.S. military. A similarly structured and led NSC will produce equally impressive results for the country now.
• Retired Ambassador Robert C. O’Brien served as the 27th U.S. national security adviser from 2019 to 2021. Alexander B. Gray served as chief of staff of the White House National Security Council from 2019 to 2021.